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INTRODUCTION

Many decades have passed since courts in several western states first
began to deal with the explosion of litigation resulting from equally frenzied oil
and gas development in the region. Now, states in the Appalachian region of
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where he studied history and political science. During his time at West Virginia University
College of Law, he was senior managing editor of the West Virginia Law Review, Volume 113.
His student note, The Tie That Binds: Forum Selection Clause Enforceability in West Virginia,
113 W. VA. L. REv. 95 (2010), was awarded best student note. He graduated Order of the Coif
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the eastern United States are rumbling with the sounds of new natural gas
development triggered by the discovery of vast natural gas fields heretofore
unknown or thought impossible to capture. Named for the geological stratum in
which the prized gas is found, the Marcellus and Utica shale discoveries have
triggered a modern-day "gold rush" involving modest landowners and large
corporations alike. The literature is already bustling with scholarly activity
focused on the implications of this newfound resource.'
One aspect of mineral development to which the literature has paid
surprisingly little attention is a cause of action called slander of title.2 In West
Virginia, slander of title is defined as the(1) publication of (2) a false statement
(3) derogatory to plaintiffs title (4) with malice (5) causing special damages
(6) as a result of diminished value in the eyes of third parties.3 While the
elements of the cause of action are not always expressed in a like way, the
functional ingredients are nearly always the same. In most cases involving
slander of title, a plaintiffs injury is alleged to have been caused by the
wrongful assertion by another of an interest in the plaintiffs property. Often
central to the suit, the wrongful assertion frequently comes in the form of a
recorded quitclaim deed or other instrument signifying the disputed interest. In
the context of a property-based energy law practice where the value of mineral
interests can easily climb into the millions of dollars, particular care must be
taken that clouded titles do not deprive an individual of his economic stake in
the property, whether that stake arises from a fee simple, leasehold, or other
interest. To be sure, slander of title is a peculiar and not often litigated tort. But
in the rush to purchase potentially valuable mineral interests throughout greater

I
Much of the literature has focused on the environmental and regulatory aspects of natural
gas exploration. See, e.g., Kristen Allen, The Big Fracking Deal: Marcellus ShalePennsylvania's Untapped Re$ource, 23 VILL. ENvTL. L.J. 51 (2012); Jeffrey C. King et al.,
Factual Causation: The Missing Link in Hydraulic Fracture-GroundwaterContamination
Litigation, 22 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 341 (2012); Bruce M. Kramer, Federal Legislative
and Administrative Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing Operations, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 837
(2012); Ross H. Pifer, What A Short, Strange Trip It's Been: Moving ForwardAfter Five Years
of Marcellus Shale Development, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 615 (2011); Laura C. Reeder, CreatingA
Legal Framework for Regulation of Natural Gas Extraction from the Marcellus Shale
Formation, 34 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 999 (2010); Symposium, "Shale" We
Drill? The Legal and Environmental Impacts of ExtractingNatural Gas from Marcellus Shale,
22 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 189 (2011); Hannah Wiseman, FracturingRegulation Applied, 22 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 361 (2012); Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured
Appalachia, 21 VILL. ENvTL. L.J. 229 (2010).
2
A suit for slander of title can relate not only to interests in real property, but also to
personal property. See, e.g., Maragos v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 584 N.W.2d 850, 851 (N.D.
1998). Because this Article is concerned with the cause of action relevant to claims of ownership
in real property, I do not address cases involving personal property claims.
See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 873 (W. Va. 1992), aff'd on
othergrounds, 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
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Appalachia, it is probable that some aggressive actors have and will slander the
title of rightful interest owners. Such cases are likely now only beginning to
percolate in the trial courts. Accordingly, this Article intends to act as a
practitioner's guide to slander of title in the special context of mineral title
litigation, with particular emphasis on West Virginia law.
The purpose of this Article is severalfold. Part II briefly reviews the
origins of slander of title, with particular focus on underlying policy
considerations. In Part III, the action itself is dissected, and each element
receives some commentary. With the Second Restatement of Torts as a guide,
the Article notes differing treatment by the courts of various states, with special
focus on the decades-long experience of several western states in the context of
oil and gas litigation. Part IV addresses selected defenses that frequently arise
in the real property context. Finally, Part V surveys common factual scenarios
that could give rise to slander of title suits involving mineral interests.
II. BRIEF BACKGROUND

The ownership of real property has long played a fundamental role in
all aspects of life-economic and political principal among them. Indeed, the
purpose of government has been traditionally understood to be for the
protection of private property ownership. 4 An action for slander of title is but
one method by which an owner of real property can employ the power of the
law to protect his rights-particularly the right to market.s In the seminal West
Virginia decision recognizing slander of title as a cause of action, TXO
Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., the court traced the origin of the

common law tort back to
observed:

16th

Century England. The Supreme Court of Appeals

Slander of title long has been recognized as a common law
cause of action. Indeed, the slander of title cause of action was
especially important 400 years ago when many transfers of
land were oral transfers (i.e., feoffment with livery of seisin),
and when, the Domesday Book notwithstanding, land records
were much less complete than they are today.6
We need not spend much time on the action's historical lineage. It is
enough that we recognize the justifications for the continued viability of the

§ 85 (Simon & Brown ed. 2012).
The influential work on the fundamental underpinnings of slander of title is by the
estimable Professor William L. Prosser. See William L. Prosser, Injurious Falsehood: The Basis
ofLiability, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 425 (1959).
6
TXO Prod Corp., 419 S.E.2d at 878.
4

JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT
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tort, the principal of which, as noted, is the defense of real property ownership
and all of its attendant rights.
As its name suggests and the Second Restatement of Torts [hereinafter
"Second Restatement"] explains, slander of title-also called "injurious
falsehood" or simply "disparagement" in early literature-was developed by
courts that analogized to the tort of oral defamation. These cases frequently
involved oral accusations aimed at a plaintiffs title that caused him to lose a
lease or sale of the besieged property. 9 Despite the apparent similarities,
important differences exist between slander of title and personal defamation.
First, proof of special damages is an element of slander of title not always
required to prove defamation.'o Moreover, a plaintiff claiming slander of title
must establish that the defendant's act of false publication was malicious; mere
negligence will not suffice.' 1 The Second Restatement explains as follows:
The action for injurious falsehood is obviously similar in many
respects to the action for defamation. Both involve the
imposition of liability for injuries sustained through
publication to third parties of a false statement affecting the
plaintiff. Despite their similarities, however, the two torts
protect different interests and have entirely different origins in
history. The action for defamation is to protect the personal
reputation of the injured party; it arose out of the old actions
for libel and slander. The action for injurious falsehood is to
protect economic interests of the injured party against
pecuniary loss; it arose as an action on the case for the special
damage resulting from the publication.12
Because of the need to prove special damages with particularity, one
commentator has noted that the tort is more akin to "intentional interference
with economic relations than with the general damage to one's reputation
involved in the personal libel or slander actions." 3 The Second Restatement

See Forman v. Cheltenham Nat'l Bank, 502 A.2d 686, 689 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) ("An
action for slander of title safeguards an owner's marketable interest in property against another
person's false and malicious representation of the owner's title to the property.").
8
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 624 cmt. a (1977).
9
See id; see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 128,
at 967 (5th ed. 1984).
10 Mark S. Dennison, Proofof Slander or Disparagementof Title to Real Property, in 55 AM.
JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 509 (2000).
"
Karen McConnell, Comment, Slander of Title: Onward Through the Fog, 24 S. TEX. L.J.
171, 173 (1983).
12 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A cmt. g (1977).
13

See McConnell, supra note 11.
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and Prosserand Keeton on the Law of Tortsl4 are excellent resources for those
interested in further exploration of the origins of slander of title, including its
similarities to other causes of action.
Ill. THE ELEMENTS OF SLANDER OF TITLE

The elements of slander of title are straightforward, and while often set
forth by various courts in slightly different terms, its essential ingredients are
nearly always the same. Grounded in the Second Restatement, most courts,
including the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, have defined slander
of title as when a person maliciously publishes false statements derogatory to
another's property interest causing special damages.15
A.

Plaintiffs PropertyInterest

Of course, only a plaintiff with an interest in the affected property has
standing to bring a slander of title suit. The Second Restatement defines the
required interest rather broadly:
Any kind of legally protected interest in land, chattels or
intangible things may be disparaged if the interest is
transferable and therefore salable or otherwise capable of
profitable disposal. It may be real or personal, corporeal or
incorporeal, in possession or reversion. It may be protected
either by legal or equitable proceedings and may be vested or
inchoate. It may be a mortgage, lease, easement, reversion or
remainder, whether vested or contingent, in land or chattels, a
trust or other equitable interest. 16
In a very fundamental way, the requisite property interest must be a
legally enforceable interest-whether in ownership, possession, or both.17 In
the context of mineral estates, for instance, the interest held by an oil and gas
lessee (often the operator) is sufficient to permit him to maintain an action for
slander of title.18 Indeed, the affected property interest can range from fee

14

See KEETON ET AL., supra note 9,

§ 128, at 967.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 623A, 624 (1977); see also TXO Prod. Corp. v.
Alliance Res. Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 879 (W. Va. 1992), aff'd on other grounds, 509 U.S. 443
(1993).
16
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 624 cmt. c (1977).
15

1
For a more in-depth treatment of this element, see Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Slander of
Title: Sufficiency of Plaintiff's Interest in Real Property to MaintainAction, 86 A.L.R. 4TH 738
(1991).
Is
See, e.g., TXO Prod.Corp., 419 S.E.2d at 870.
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simple ownership in the entire tract, including the surface and all mineral
interests, to only the leasehold interest in a tiny percentage of the oil. Some
courts have also found that a purchaser's interest in real property may be
sufficient.' 9 On the other hand, several courts have concluded that where the
disputed property had already been sold or contracted to be sold before the
alleged disparagement occurred, the seller did not have a sufficient interest to
bring a suit for slander of title.20
Consider a recent case from California concerning property interest in
an easement. In Sumner Hill Homeowners' Association, Inc. v. Rio Mesa
Holdings, LLC, 21 a homeowners' association sued a developer of surrounding
land, claiming that the defendant slandered members' easement rights to access
a nearby river. The defendant argued that the property rights they slandered
were inadequate to constitute "title" to support a claim for slander of title.22 The
court did not agree, reasoning that
no action was necessary to perfect or establish plaintiffs'
easement rights. Rather, plaintiffs' rights accrued and vested
when they purchased their lots because (1) their deeds
referenced a subdivision map with a system of roads, including
[the disputed river access road] and (2) [defendants] and their
sales agents made promises of river access to plaintiffs or their
predecessors during the marketing of the residential lots. 23
Thus, an interest as small (or large) as a simple right-of-way easement
can serve as a basis for a slander of title suit.
An interesting split of authority has developed on the question of
whether title acquired by adverse possession but not established by a judicial
decision can support a slander of title action.24 The courts following the view
that an action for slander of title cannot be maintained by a plaintiff-whose
title to the disputed property was acquired by adverse possession though not
confirmed by judicial decree-emphasize that "protection from injury to the

See, e.g., Williams v. Jennings, 755 S.W.2d 874, 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
See, e.g., Kirchoff v. Moulder Bros., Inc., 391 So. 2d 347 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980);
Bynum v. Bynum, 531 P.2d 618 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975); White & Baxter, Inc. v. Jade Square &
Tower, Ltd., 404 N.Y.S.2d 105 (App. Div. 1978); Bennett v. Pace, 731 P.2d 33 (Wyo. 1987).
21
141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 109 (Ct. App. 2012)
22
Id. at 134.
19

20

23

Id

24
Compare Howard v. Schaniel, 169 Cal. Rptr. 678 (Ct. App. 1980) (stating that an action
for slander of title is not available), with Colquhoun v. Webber, 684 A.2d 405 (Me. 1996)
(acquiring title by adverse possession, even though it had not been established by judicial decree,
was sufficient ownership interest to maintain action for slander of title).
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salability of property is the thrust of the tort." 2 5 Title acquired by adverse
possession is not a marketable title until it is established by judicial
proceedings; before such time, the law presumes the record titleholder is the
rightful owner. Therefore, adversely possessed property, absent a judicial
decree, cannot support a slander suit.26
On the other hand, the expansive description of legally protected
interests found in the Second Restatement would seem to include an interest
held by the adverse possessor-with or without a judicial decree in-hand.27 At
least one court following the Second Restatement adopted this view. 28 Another
emphasized that once a person meets the requirements for adverse possession,
"title vests in that person by operation of law" regardless of judicial action.29 In
this way, no judicial action is necessary to effectuate the transfer to the adverse
possessor because the latter's interest in the subject property is sufficient to
maintain a slander of title claim. Under the Second Restatement's broad
definition, and other fundamental tenets supporting the free alienation and
protection of real property interests, this is the better view.
Ultimately, it is crucial for attorneys concerned with potential slander
of title to identify and define the ownership interest at issue and place it in the
proper context. Such a determination will also help ensure that the amount of
special damages, among other related concerns, is accurate. This is especially
true in light of the complicated and frequently incomplete title history of many
disputed mineral interests. While the property interest element of slander of
title is always necessary and not often disputed, it is important to recognize that
such property interests may be broadly defined, thus making the hurdle of
standing easy to overcome.
B.

Publication

A slander of title plaintiff must also establish that the defendant's
statement derogatory to plaintiffs property interest was published. 30 As part of
this requirement, the plaintiff must allege and prove that the defendant
communicated the defamatory statement to a third party."

25

Howard, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 682.

26

Id.
See RESTATEMENT

27

(SECOND) OF TORTS § 624 cmt. c (1977).
See, e.g., Colquhoun v. Webber, 684 A.2d 405 (Me. 1996).
29
Davis v. Sponhauer, 574 N.E.2d 292, 300 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
30
See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870 (W. Va. 1992).
31
See, e.g., Tishman-Speyer Equitable S. Fla. Venture v. Knight Invs., Inc., 591 So. 2d 213
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); TXO Prod.Corp., 419 S.E.2d at 870.
28
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Publication means the act of making the defamatory statement
known to any person or persons other than the plaintiff
himself. It is not necessary that there should be any publication
in the popular sense of making the statement public. A private
and confidential communication to a single individual is
sufficient. Nor need it be published in the sense of being
written or printed.... 32
Indeed, "[t]he slander may consist of a statement in writing, printing, or
by word of mouth, and may relate to personal as well as real property." 33 Of
course, communicating the defamatory statement to the plaintiff alone would
not constitute actionable publication.34 Methods of publication often vary.
In Mississippi, for instance, slander of title may consist of "conduct"
that raises a question as to another's right to particular property,36 and it was
found in one case that the act of burying a dead body on the subject property
"constitutes the statement slandering [plaintiffs] title."3 7 Despite the unique
circumstances of that case, authority illustrates that the most common method
of publication is the filing or recording of a false instrument or notice
purporting to affect the title to property.3 8 More such examples are set forth
below.39
C.

False Statement

Without exception, the statement published by defendant respecting the
plaintiffs property interest must be false.40 In the context of real property, a
false statement may be as simple as an assertion that the plaintiff does not own

32

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1348 (9th ed. 2009) (quoting

R.F.V.

HEUSTON, SALMOND ON

THE LAW OF TORTS 154 (17th ed. 1977)).
33

Walley v. Hunt, 54 So. 2d 393, 396 (Miss. 1951).

See, e.g., Bonded Inv. & Realty Co. v. Waksman, 437 So. 2d 162, 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983).
3
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1348 (9th ed. 2009). ("The publication of a libel might be
in the form of a book, pamphlet or newspaper, but nothing of that nature is required. A letter sent
to a single individual is sufficient." (quoting ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL
LAW 489 (3d ed. 1982))).
36
Walley, 54 So.2d at 396.
3
Welford v. Dickerson, 524 So. 2d 331, 334 (Miss. 1988).
3
See, e.g., Reaugh v. McCollum Exploration Co., 163 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. 1942) (concerning
a wrongful refusal to release oil and gas lease); Jarrett v. Ross, 164 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1942) (concerning a wrongful recordation of deed); Commercial Sec. Co. v. Thompson,
239 S.W.2d. 911 (Tex. App. 1951) (concerning a wrongful filing of judgment lien).
3
See infra Part V.
34

40

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 623A

(1977).
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the subject property of which he is the apparent owner or that the title is
somehow defective. 4 1 Other common falsehoods found in the case law include
an assertion by a defendant that he has an interest in or lien on the subject
property.4 2
While not often the subject of dispute, the question of falsity
sometimes requires a more nuanced approach. Consider a recent Georgia
decision, Executive Excellence, LLC v. Martin Brothers Investments, LLC. 43 In

that case, an ongoing dispute over the terms of a contract for the purchase of
real property eventually led the seller to file a slander of title claim against the
purported purchaser on the basis of statements made at a public meeting by the
purchaser's attorney.44 The central inquiry was whether the attorney's
statements, which indicated there was active litigation involving the property,
were false. The party asserting slander of title argued that the statements were
plainly false at the time made because the litigation referenced was not
commenced until a week after the statement was made.45 The court disagreed,
reasoning that while technically false, the statement was substantially true in
context of the acrimonious dispute between the parties:
The lawsuits were filed on May 30, 2007 and May 31, 2007
respectively, approximately one week after the alleged
statement was made. Nevertheless, "[d]efamation law
overlooks minor inaccuracies and concentrates upon
substantial truth. A statement is not considered false unless it
would have a different effect on the mind of the listener from
that which the pleaded truth would have produced." It is
undisputed that the parties were then embroiled in a contract
dispute over the purchase and sale of the properties when the
alleged statement was made. The lawsuits were filed shortly
thereafter, presenting active litigation. Under these
circumstances, the attorney's statement presented a minor
factual error which did not go to the substance of the statement
and did not render the communication false for defamation
purposes.4 6
Irrespective of the particular analysis employed by the Georgia court in
the case just discussed, the issue of falsity typically goes unchallenged or, in
See, e.g., Rorvig v. Douglas, 873 P.2d 492, 496 (Wash. 1994).
See, e.g., Cawrse v. Signal Oil Co., 103 P.2d 729 (Or. 1940); McClure v. Fischer Attached
Homes, 145 Ohio Misc. 2d 38 (2007).
43
710 S.E.2d 169 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).
4
Id. at 173.
41

42

45

Id. at 174.

46

Id. at 175 (internal citation omitted).
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most cases, is bound up with the question of malice. Courts and litigants
frequently focus their attention on the latter instance.
D.

Malice

A slander of title case will often rise or fall on whether the plaintiff can
establish that the defendant's publication of a false statement was malicious.47
Malice has been defined as an intent to deceive or injure,48 and has been used to
characterize a defendant who "raises his own claim without any reasonable
grounds" and otherwise lacks good faith.49 While "[courts] want to discourage
people from slandering the title of others, [they] do not want to discourage
people from making legitimate (though possibly weak) claims of their own."50
One court explained that
malice is a necessary ingredient to entitle plaintiff to recover;
that it is the gist of the action; that it cannot be maintained if
the claim was asserted by defendant in good faith, and if the
act complained of was founded upon probable cause or was
prompted by a reasonable belief, although the statement may
have been false.5 '
"As a general rule, the defense with the greatest chance of success is a
contention that the defendant acted in good faith."5 For this reason, malice has
been called "the principal element of the cause of action. . . and the one most
difficult to prove."
Some courts have held that actual malice need not be proved, but rather
may be implied from the language used or from the nature of the defendant's
actions. 54 Thus, malice can often be inferred in the absence of evidence
indicating the defendant's good faith. Put another way, malice may be implied

47
See, e.g., Noble v. Johnson, 68 P.2d 838, 841 (Okla. 1937) ("[M]alice is a necessary
ingredient of an action for slander of title.").
48
See, e.g., Bright v. Gass, 831 S.W.2d 149 (Ark. Ct. App. 1992); Maragos v. Union Oil Co.
of Cal., 584 N.W.2d 850 (N.D. 1998); Montecalvo v. Mandarelli, 682 A.2d 918, 923 (R.I. 1996).
49
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 879 (W. Va. 1992)

Id.
5'
Henderson v. Millis, 373 N.W.2d 497, 506 (Iowa 1985) (quoting Miller v. First Nat'l
Bank, 264 N.W. 272, 274 (Iowa 1935)) (emphasis added).
52
Richard E. Kaye, Cause of Action for Slander of Title to Real Property,in 40 CAUSES OF
ACTION §31, at 381 (2d ed. 2013).
s3
Misco Leasing, Inc. v. Keller, 490 F.2d 545, 548 (10th Cir. 1974).
54
See, e.g., Montecalvo v. Mandarelli, 682 A.2d 918, 924 (R.I. 1996); Peckham v.
Hirschfeld, 570 A.2d 663, 667 (R.I. 1990); Huff v. Jennings, S.E.2d 886, 891-92 (S.C. Ct. App.
1995).
50
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from "the publication of an untrue statement disparaging another's title under
such circumstances as would lead a reasonable man to foresee that a sale or
lease of the property would thereby be prevented, regardless of the publisher's
motive, intent, or good faith."55 Therefore, questions of good faith can be
particularly fact-intensive and often not susceptible to summary judgment.56
Even so, evidence of negligence57 or a "mere technical defect in the execution
of a document affecting title" will not alone suffice.
West Virginia, like many jurisdictions, allows a slander of title plaintiff
to present evidence implying malice on the part of the defendant where no
actual malice can be shown. Indeed, the TXO decision amply illustrates how
other courts may treat the issue of establishing the element of malice by
implication. In TXO, West Virginia's highest court affirmed a judgment of
$19,000 in compensatory damages and ten million dollars in punitive damages
against TXO Production Company for slander of title.59 At issue were oil and
gas development rights to a 1000-acre tract of property known as the Blevins
Tract.60 Alliance Resources held a lease of the oil and gas rights to the Blevins
Tract from Tug Fork Land Company. TXO sought to acquire the oil and gas
rights to the tract and approached Alliance Resources, seeking an outright
sale.61 Alliance Resources declined and instead proposed a joint venture where
TXO and Alliance Resources would share both costs and royalties resulting
from development of the mineral interest. 62
TXO commissioned a title search on the tract and learned that there
was a conveyance in 1958 of certain coal rights underlying it from Tug Fork
Land to Leo Signaigo, Jr., interests that were later transferred to Virginia Crews
Coal Company. That 1958 conveyance reserved the oil and gas rights in the
tract to Tug Fork Land. However, TXO attempted to persuade Signaigo to sign

Gates v. Utsey, 177 So. 2d 486, 489 (Fla. Dist. App. 1965) (citation omitted).
See, e.g., Montecalvo, 682 A.2d at 924-25. For example, evidence that the defendant
consulted with his attorney may tend to negate a finding of malice, but such questions are often
left to the jury. See Duncan Land & Exploration, Inc. v. Littlepage, 984 S.W.2d 318, 332-33
(Tex. Crim. App. 1998). But see Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Luckel, 171 S.W.2d 902, 906 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1943) ("[A] claim of title does not constitute malice where such claim is made under
color of title upon the advice of attorneys .... .").
7
See, e.g., Dabbs v. Four Tees, Inc., 36 So. 3d 542 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008).
58
Brodie v. Nw. Tr. Services, Inc., 12-CV-0469-TOR, 2012 WL 4468491, at *7 (E.D. Wash.
Sept. 27, 2012).
5
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870 (W. Va. 1992).
60
Id at 875.
"

56

61
62
63

Id.
Id
Id at 876.
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an affidavit stating that he did not know whether or not the oil and gas rights to
the tract were included in the 1958 conveyance; he refused.
Despite the reservation in the 1958 deed, and despite Signaigo's
representation that the oil and gas rights had not been included in his
conveyance from Tug Fork Land, TXO paid Virginia Crews Coal Company a
nominal amount for a quitclaim deed to the mineral rights it ultimately obtained
from Signaigo. 64 TXO then argued that Tug Fork Land's lease to Alliance
Resources was invalid and threatened to file a lawsuit unless Alliance
Resources gave TXO concessions on the royalty split proposed for their joint
venture. Shortly thereafter, TXO filed a suit against Alliance Resources to quiet
title to the oil and gas rights underlying the Blevins Tract. 6 5 The evidence
demonstrated, and the jury agreed, that TXO had embarked on a fraudulent
scheme to create a false cloud on title with the intent to reduce the royalties it
was to pay Alliance Resources under the terms of its joint venture.
At trial, TXO advanced a vigorous defense of good faith to rebut the
inference of malice. The plaintiff proffered evidence of prior bad acts by TXO
in order to satisfy the malice element, which included testimony by four
lawyers demonstrating that the case was "but part of a pattern and practice of
deception and chiseling by TXO."66 The jury found that TXO had slandered
Alliance Resource's title and awarded compensatory and punitive damages. As
the case demonstrates, evidence of implied malice, therefore, is sufficient under
West Virginia law.
Alternatively, some courts require a showing of actual malice.6 7 Under
this view, the plaintiff must present evidence not only that no reasonable belief
or good faith supports the allegedly slanderous statement, 6 8 but that the
defendant either knew the disparaging statement was false or that it was made
with reckless disregard for its truth. 69 "Reckless disregard" has been defined as

Id. at 877.
Id.
66
Id. at 883. The Supreme Court of Appeals later determined that the evidence was properly
admitted as prior bad acts under Rule 404(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence. Id. at 884.
6
See, e.g., Pecora v. Szabo, 418 N.E.2d 431, 438 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (observing that "more
recent cases appear to have rejected [a] liberal reading" of the malice requirement and concluding
that "the weight of authority holds that a showing of malice requires knowledge by defendant
that the disparaging statements were false or reckless disregard of this falsity").
68
See, e.g., Rorvig v. Douglas, 873 P.2d 492, 496 (Wash. 1994) (en banc); Brown v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 617 P.2d 704 (Wash. 1980) (en banc).
69
See, e.g., Pecora, 418 N.E.2d at 439; Hossler v. Hammel, 587 N.E.2d 133 (Ind. Ct. App.
1992); Davis v. Sponhauer, 574 N.E.2d 292 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
6

65
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publishing the defamatory statement "despite a high degree of awareness of
probable falsity or entertain[ing] serious doubts as to [its] truth."o
Notably, the malice element of slander of title requiring a showing of
lack of good faith and absence of probable cause (often called "legal" malice)
is not the same as the showing of malice necessary to obtain a punitive
damages jury instruction.7n The latter (called "actual malice") requires an
"actual evil intent, ill will or hatred..... 72 West Virginia law holds that a jury
may assess punitive damages where there is proof of "gross fraud, malice,
oppression, or wanton, willful, or reckless conduct or criminal indifference to
civil obligations affecting the rights of others .

. .

.

Thus, it is important for

courts to understand that evidence of lack of good faith or absence of
reasonable grounds to believe the allegedly slanderous statement alone does not
*
74
merit a punitive damages instruction.
At bottom, if the party who publishes a false statement has reasonable
grounds to believe it, that party has not acted with legal malice and the cause of
action cannot succeed.7 5
E.

Causing Special Damages

The law does not presume damages as a consequence of slander of
title; rather, the plaintiff must specifically plead and present evidence that he

70
See, e.g., Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667 (1989) (citation
omitted); see also Kuwik v. Starmark Star Mktg. & Admin., Inc.,619 N.E.2d 129, 133 (Ill. 1993).
See, e.g., Hamilton v. Amwar Petroleum Co., Inc., 769 P.2d 146, 149 (Okla. 1989)
71
("Malice, as the term is used in an action to recover punitive damages, signifies a standard of
conduct more culpable than that necessary to recover in a slander of title action. Therefore,
instances such as that now considered may arise where recovery of actual damages in a slander of
title action is warranted by the evidence and the proof will not support an award of punitive
damages.").
72
Id
7
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 895-96 (W. Va. 1992) (McHugh,
J., concurring) (quoting Syl. pt. 1, Goodwin v. Thomas, 403 S.E.2d 13 (W. Va. 1991)).
See Hamilton, 769 P.2d at 149 ("[T]he showing of malice required to prevail in a slander of
74
title action and that needed to submit a punitive damage question to the jury differ enough that a
prima facie showing in a slander of title action, without more, is not determinative of an adequate
showing for submission of a punitive damage issue to the jury."); see also Duncan Land &
Exploration, Inc. v. Littlepage, 984 S.W.2d 318, 332 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) ("In the context of a
slander of title action, the type of malice required is 'legal malice', which means 'merely that the
act must have been deliberate conduct without reasonable cause.' However, the charge submitted
to the jury, which was not objected to, asked whether [defendant] acted with 'reckless disregard.'
This is a form of 'actual malice,' which is required for exemplary damages." (citation and
footnote omitted)).
See, e.g., Hogg v. Wolske, 130 P.3d 1087 (Idaho 2006); Gambino v. Boulevard Mortg.
7
Corp., 922 N.E.2d 380 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2013

13

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 115, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 11
Ill 0

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 115

suffered special damages resulting from a published statement that was
derogatory to his property interest. 76 In establishing the pecuniary loss, the
slander of title plaintiff will frequently present evidence of a loss of a sale. 7
Indeed, "[t]he chief characteristic of special damages is a realized loss." 78
Special damages must be specifically pled and subsequently "proved to a
reasonable degree of certainty" and "are not recoverable if deemed to be too
remote."79 In such cases, "the trier of fact must be furnished data sufficient to
determine damages without resort to mere speculation or conjecture."80
Section 633 of the Second Restatement sets forth the general view:
(1) The pecuniary loss for which a publisher of injurious
falsehood is subject to liability is restricted to
(a) the pecuniary loss that results directly and
immediately from the effect of the conduct of third
persons, including impairment of vendibility or value
caused by disparagement, and
(b) the expense of measures reasonably necessary to
counteract the publication, including litigation to
remove the doubt cast upon vendibility or value by
disparagement.
(2) This pecuniary loss may be established by
(a) proof of the conduct of specific persons, or

Allowing a plaintiff to proceed without pleading special damages is tantamount to
awarding damages "under the rubric 'cloud on title.' A suit to remove a cloud from title is a suit
for a specific, equitable remedy." Ellis v. Waldrop, 656 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Tex. 1983); see also
Humble Oil & Ref Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 191 F.2d 705, 718 (5th Cir. 1951) ("A suit to quiet title is
a purely equitable proceeding . . . The title to minerals in place may be freed from adverse claims
by a suit to quiet title thereto or remove clouds therefrom." (citation omitted)). See generally
Gardner v. Buckeye Say. & Loan Co., 152 S.E. 530, 531 (W. Va. 1930) ("To quiet title to realty,
or to remove an existing cloud, or to prevent a threatened cloud, is an ancient and wellestablished head of equity jurisprudence. The broad grounds on which equity interferes to
remove a cloud on title are the prevention of litigation, the protection of the true title and
possession, and because it is the real interest of both parties, and promotive [sic] of right and
justice, that the precise state of the title be known, if all are acting bona fide.").
n
See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v Bonney, 299 F. Supp. 790 (W.D. Okla. 1969) (concerning
the loss of appreciation by implication); Shell Oil Co. v. Howth, 159 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. 1942)
(concerning the loss of sale); Am. Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co. v. First Wis. Mortg. Trust, 577
S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (concerning the loss of value).
7
KEETON ET AL., supranote 9, § 128, at 971 n.3.
7
Johnson v. Monsanto Co., 303 N.W.2d 86, 93 (N.D. 1981).
80
Id. at 95.
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(b) proof that the loss has resulted from the conduct of
a number of persons whom it is impossible to
identify."
1.

Loss of Specific Sale or Lease

Courts are divided as to whether the plaintiff must identify a specific,
prospective buyer who was prevented by the slander from purchasing the
disparaged property--that is, whether plaintiff must present proof of a specific
lost sale. On one side, some courts require evidence showing that a pending
sale was frustrated by the alleged slander:
In order to show that the words uttered have caused injury to
the plaintiff, it is generally necessary to aver and show that
they were uttered pending some treaty or public action for the
sale of the property, and that thereby some intending purchaser
was prevented from bidding or competing[.] If the plaintiff has
merely a general intention to sell, J] the plaintiff does not suffer
any damage from their utterance.
An early North Dakota decision similarly held that
[w]ords spoken or written in relation to property or title are not
actionable per se, and so special damages must be shown,
generally loss of sale or lease. Plaintiff must show "loss of sale
to some particular person" or that she was "about to sell or
make an advantageous disposition of his land, and another
impertinently interfered, and falsely and maliciously
represented that his title was not good, and thereby prevented
the sale, or [] getting for it as fair a price as he otherwise would
have done". . . .

Many Texas courts have found that a plaintiff must demonstrate the
loss of a sale or a lease to a particular prospective purchaser in order to
establish special damages, though that state's courts have not been uniform in
this regard.84 At least one Texas appellate decision concluded that proof of

si

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 633

(1977).

McNichols v. Conejos-K Corp., 482 P.2d 432, 435 (Colo. App. 1971) (quoting
Zimmerman v. Hinderlider, 97 P.2d 443, 447 (Colo. 1939)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As noted below, at least one more recent Colorado decision has relaxed the rule. See infra note
91 and accompanying text.
83
Briggs v. Coykendall, 224 N.W. 202, 206 (N.D. 1929) (internal citations omitted).
82

84
Compare Shell Oil Co. v. Howth, 159 S.W.2d 483, 490 (Tex. 1942) (requiring specific
sale), and Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Luckel, 171 S.W.2d 902, 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) (same),
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specific pending sale was not required, reasoning that "the trend in the law is
away from an overly rigid circumspection of special damages in actions such as
slander of title," citing to the Second Restatement § 633 and related
comments.85 Needless to say, the Supreme Court of Texas later overruled the
decision, once again reaffirming the stringent specific sale requirement in that
state.86 A recent Texas appellate decision has recognized the requirement's
continued vitality.8 7 The specific sale requirement still retains a strong
following.
Some courts that have required proof of a loss of a specific sale have
also recognized an exception for cases where the lost sale is impossible to
identify. 89 A Wisconsin appellate decision, clearly uncomfortable with the
rigidity of the specific sale requirement, though unwilling to completely discard
it, adopted a more relaxed approach:
We hold that, when determining the necessary proof for special
damages, the trial court must consider whether it is reasonable
under the factual circumstances to expect the plaintiff to show
that a slander of title prevented a particular sale. And, if such a
requirement is not reasonable under the circumstances, the trial
court must then determine the degree of particularity
required.90
The Wisconsin court cited approvingly to a Colorado appeals court
decision, which cast the rule as follows:
Currently, the plaintiff is required to be particular only if it is
reasonable to expect him to be so. If it is not a practical
possibility to show specific losses, damages may then be
proved by evidence similar to that used to prove lost profits
resulting from a breach of contract. Consequently, if a plaintiff
can present sufficient evidence, using detailed statistical and

with Walker v. Ruggles, 540 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (not requiring proof of
specific sale).
85
Walker, 540 S.W.2d at 474-75.
86
See A. H. Belo Corp. v. Sanders, 632 S.W.2d 145, 145-46 (Tex. 1982).
See Smith v. Hennington, 249 S.W.3d 600, 604-05 (Tex. App. 2008).
See, e.g., Sussex Real Estate Corp. v. Sbrocca, 634 P.2d 999, 1002 (Colo. App. 1981);
Whyburn v. Norwood, 267 S.E.2d 374, 377 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980); Smith v. Hennington, 249
S.W.3d 600, 604 (Tex. App. 2008); Wharton v. Tri-State Drilling & Boring, 824 A.2d 531, 538
(Vt. 2003); Brown v. Safeway Stores Inc., 617 P.2d 704, 713 (Wash. 1980).
8
See, e.g., Barkhom v. Adlib Assocs., Inc., 203 F. Supp. 121, 122 (D. Haw. 1962).
90
Tym v. Ludwig, 538 N.W.2d 600, 603 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
8

8
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expert proof, to exclude the possibility that other factors caused
the loss of general business, recovery is allowed. 9 1
Going further, California decisions have indicated that it is not
necessary to show the loss of a particular sale in order to prove special damage
flowing from the alleged slander. 92 For example, in Davis v. Wood,93 a
California appeals court concluded that because the plaintiffs leasehold
mineral interest was "greatly depreciated" in value and "rendered
unmarketable," his complaint could survive dismissal.9 4 In saving the claim
from dismissal, the Davis court observed that once remanded, the trial court
would be justified in requiring the plaintiff to set forth his damages with
"greater particularity."95 At least one later California decision has affirmed the
principle that special damages "may be established by other than showing a
loss of a particular potential sale."96 This more liberal view is properly framed
and set forth as follows:
The thrust of defendants' argument is aimed at the fact that
plaintiffs did not establish that any particular prospective
purchaser or lessee was deterred from negotiating or
contracting with plaintiffs because he was the recipient of the
false information disseminated by the defendants. It is
recognized, however, that the property owner may recover for
the impairment of the vendibility of his property without
showing that the loss was caused by prevention of a particular
sale. The most usual manner in which a third person's reliance
upon disparaging matter causes pecuniary loss is by preventing
a sale to a particular purchaser. The disparaging matter may, if
widely disseminated, cause pecuniary loss by depriving its
possessor of a market in which, but for the disparagement, his
land or other thing might with reasonable certainty have found
a purchaser.9 7
Going beyond the Second Restatement, this view holds that evidencesuch as that gained through expert testimony-regarding the value of the
subject property before and after the disparagement can establish proof of

Teilhaber Mfg. Co. v. Unarco Materials Storage, Inc., 791 P.2d 1164, 1168 (Colo. App.
1989) (internal citations omitted).
92
See, e.g., Hill v. Allan, 66 Cal. Rptr. 676, 689 (Ct. App. 1968).
9
143 P.2d 740 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943).
91

94

Id. at 745.

9s

Id.
Glass v. Gulf Oil Corp., 96 Cal. Rptr. 902, 910 (Ct. App. 1970).
Id. at 909 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).

96
9
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special damages. 98 Thus, the question of "reasonable certainty," like in the
California case cited here, is often left for jury determination. This view does
not maintain a wide following.
Other states, like West Virginia, have not had occasion to explicitly
decide whether a specific sale is required, though it is likely these states would
look to § 633 of the Second Restatement to ascertain their preferred policy. 99
Recent decisions, such as the Wisconsin and Colorado decisions described
above, suggest a trend away from a strict specific sale requirement, though they
have clearly not abandoned it. Nor should they. The loss of a specific sale has
long been the cornerstone of the special damages requirement,10 a rule justified
by the unique problems associated with establishing damages absent
speculation. 01 Accordingly, attorneys prosecuting a slander of title claim must
be prepared to specifically allege and present evidence of the loss of a specific
sale in connection with the slander, or, alternatively, indicate how ascertaining
such information is impossible. Despite the view of California, most courts are
unlikely to sustain a pleading or claim that only generally alleges that the
slander impaired vendibility in the ordinary course.
2.

Attorney's Fees

Most courts recognize that the attorney's fees incurred in removing a
cloud from the plaintiffs title are recoverable as special damages in a slander
of title suit. 10 2 Indeed, as in the TXO case, it has been found that "expenses
incurred by plaintiffs in the form of attorney fees and costs to clear title and
remove the doubt cast upon their property rights by the recorded falsehood are
sufficient special damages to support a cause of action for slander of title; no
other pecuniary damages need be shown."' 0 3 It is important to note, however,

98

Id at 910-11.

99
See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 881 n.7 (W. Va. 1992)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 633 (1977)).
100
See Swan v. Tappan, 59 Mass. 104, 104 (1849); Wilson v. Dubois, 29 N.W. 68, 69 (Minn.
1886).
0l It is axiomatic that the principal goal of most rules of damages is to place
the injured party,
to the extent possible, in the position he would have been in but for the defendant's wrongful
conduct. The speculative nature of damages for slander of title, in particular, has properly
chastened most courts to hold fast to the specific sale requirement.
102
See TXO Prod Corp., 419 S.E.2d at 881 ("We follow the clear majority rule in holding
that attorneys' fees incurred in removing spurious clouds from a title qualify as special damages
in an action for slander of title." (citations omitted)).
103
Sumner Hill Homeowners' Ass'n, v. Rio Mesa Holdings, LLC, 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 109, 139
(Ct. App. 2012); see also Skyland Metro. Dist. v. Mountain W. Enter., LLC, 184 P.3d 106, 13132 (Colo. App. 2007); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 633(1)(b) (1977) (pecuniary loss in
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that the attorney's fees and costs associated with bringing the slander of title
action itself are not recoverable, per the traditional "American Rule" regarding
the recovery of attorney's fees in the United States. 104
Thus, in combination with a well-supported demand for punitive
damages, it is easy to see how in many slander cases, proof of special damages
relating to a loss of a specific sale or lease may not be needed to recover
substantial money damages.
IV. SELECTED DEFENSES

Among the defenses asserted by parties faced with a slander of title
claim, two in particular are notable among the case law and thus deserve
attention here. Both statute of limitations and privilege defenses are commonly
asserted in a variety of civil actions, and this is no less true in actions for
slander of title.
A.

Statute ofLimitations

The traditional view is that the statute of limitations governing actions
for libel and slander applies to actions for slander of title.105 However, a court
adopting the contrary position has observed that "the real nature of the action
and the better reasoned cases from other jurisdictions lead us to the conclusion
that the one-year statute of limitation for personal slander and libel has no
application" for the "thrust of the tort action of slander of title is the
interference with a prospect of sale of real property or interference with a
proprietary right."l 06 These cases have concluded that the more sensible
approach is to look to the limitations period governing actions for trespass or
injury to real property, rather than to the limitation provision dealing with

slander of title action restricted to, in part, "the expense of measures reasonably necessary to
counteract the publication, including litigation").
104 See, e.g., Montgomery Props. Corp. v. Econ. Forms Corp., 305 N.W.2d 470, 478-79 (Iowa
1981); Colquhoun v. Webber, 684 A.2d 405, 413 (Me. 1996).
105
See, e.g., Hosey v. Cent. Bank of Birmingham, 528 So. 2d 843, 844 (Ala. 1988); Old
Plantation Corp. v. Maule Indus., 68 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. 1953); Walley v. Hunt, 54 So. 2d 393,
398 (Miss. 1951); Buehrer v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 175 N.E. 25, 27 (Ohio 1931);
Woodard v. Pac. Fruit & Produce Co., 106 P.2d 1043, 1046 (Or. 1940); Pro Golf Mfg. v. Tribune
Review Newspaper Co., 809 A.2d 243, 246 (Pa. 2002) ("We therefore hold that the statute of
limitations for slander is the same whether the slander involves property or the person.").
106
Selby v. Taylor, 290 S.E.2d 767, 769 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (emphasis added).
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personalinjuries such as libel and slander. 10 7 This view is the better one, as the
cases explain.
The practitioner should be aware that the statute of limitations may
vary from state to state, with some states having not yet addressed the issue.
West Virginia, for example, has a particularly opaque general or catch-all
limitations period statute that in the absence of a judicial decision leaves the
question open. 08 The language of section § 55-2-12(a) of the West Virginia
Code appears to indicate that actions "for damage to property" must be brought
within two years. 09
The problem of accrual presents another interesting question that many
states, including West Virginia, have not yet had occasion to resolve. Some
courts hold the view that the right of action accrues at the time of
publication," 0 though more reasoned authority indicates a contrary stance, as
illustrated by the view taken by at least one Texas court." In the context of a
mineral law suit, the Supreme Court of Mississippi explained the former view:
The execution and filing for record of the mineral deeds
purporting to convey title to an undivided one-half interest in
the minerals on complainant's land was in effect an assertion
of claim of ownership by the defendants of an undivided onehalf interest in said minerals and a denial of the complainant's
ownership of such interest. The assertion by the defendants of
such interest in the manner alleged, if falsely and maliciously
made, constituted a disparagement of the complainant's title.
That is the tort which gave rise to complainant's cause of
action for damages for slander of title and the complainant's
right to sue therefor accrued at the time of the execution and
filing for record of said mineral deeds. The full measure of
damages that might ultimately result from the defendants'
wrongful acts may not have been immediately foreseeable, but
107
See, e.g., Howard v. Hudson, 259 F.2d 29, 32 (9th Cir. 1958) (applying California law);
Lase Co. v. Wein Prods., Inc., 357 F. Supp. 210, 212 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (applying Illinois law);
King v. Miller, 133 S.E. 302, 303 (Ga. Ct. App. 1926).
108
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-2-12 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); see also Duffy v. Ogden
Newspapers, Inc., 294 S.E.2d 121, 122 (W. Va. 1982) ("Our general statute of limitations for
personal actions, W. Va. Code, 55-2-12, is difficult to interpret."). In West Virginia, an action for
defamation, whether libel or slander, is governed by a statute of limitations period of one year.
See Syl. pt. 1, Cavendish v. Moffitt, 253 S.E.2d 558, 558 (W. Va. 1979).
109 See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-2-12(a).
110 See Hosey, 528 So. 2d at 844-45; Old PlantationCorp., 68 So. 2d at
182.
I See Kidd v. Hoggett, 331 S.W.2d 515, 520 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); see also Lacroix v.
Villio, 49 So. 20, 21 (La. 1909); Green v. Chamberlain, 60 So. 2d 120, 124 (La. Ct. App. 1952);
Chesebro v. Powers, 44 N.W. 290, 291 (Mich. 1889); New England Oil & Pipe Line Co. v.
Rogers, 7 P.2d 638, 642 (Okla. 1931).
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complainant's cause of action accrued when the instruments
were filed for public record, and the statute of limitations
began to run at that time.112
Expressing the contrary view, a Texas court has observed that if one
element, such as "frustration of a specific sale," constituting special damages is
necessary to prove the claim, "the cause of action did not mature until the
frustration occurred."" 3 This makes sense, for "[a]ny other rule would mean
that limitation was running against a plaintiff before he had a cause of
action."ll 4 Thus, the limitations period accrues not from the date of publication,
but from the time a prospective sale is lost because of the purported cloud on
the plaintiff s title. This is the better view.
B.

Privileged Communications

Another important defense to a slander of title claim is an assertion that
the allegedly false publication is privileged. "Privileged communications are
either absolute or qualified.""' 5 In general, statements made in judicial
proceedings, including in pleadings, are absolutely privileged.1 6 Depending on
the nature and timing of the statements, among other things, the issue of
privilege can raise interesting questions in slander of title suits,' 17 especially
when one considers that even a malicious statement can be privileged." 8
Litigants seeking to advance the affirmative defense of privilege, whether
absolute or qualified, should look to the many cases addressing the issue in the
context of personal defamation actions. More specific assertions of privilege
112

Walley v. Hunt, 54 So. 2d 393, 398 (Miss. 1986).

Kidd, 331 S.W.2d at 520; see also Shell Oil Co. v. Howth, 159 S.W.2d 483, 490 (Tex.
1942).
114
Kidd, 331 S.W.2d at 520.
"3

"

Pond Place Partners, Inc. v. Poole, 567 S.E.2d 881, 892 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002). The Pond

Place decision sets forth a helpful explanation of common law privileges in the context of a
slander of title action. See id. at 892-94.
116 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 635 (1977) ("The rules on absolute privilege to
publish defamatory matter stated in §§ 583 to 592A apply to the publication of an injurious
falsehood."); see, e.g., Sailboat Key, Inc. v. Gardner, 378 So. 2d 47, 48-49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979); Bennett v. McKibben, 915 P.2d 400, 404 (Okla. Civ. App. 1996).
"
See Conservative Club of Wash. v. Finkelstein, 738 F. Supp. 6, 13 (D.D.C. 1990) (alleging
slanderous statements made by attorney in contemplation of litigation found privileged).
11
See Collins v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 566 S.E.2d 595, 598 (W. Va. 2002) ("Because an
absolute privilege removes all possibility of remedy for a wrong that may even be committed
with malice, such a privilege is permitted only in limited circumstances."). Collins provides an
excellent discussion, including references to case law from other jurisdictions, of the principles
supporting the conferral of absolute privilege to statements made before and during judicial
proceedings. See id. at 598-600.
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relevant to slander of title claims, such as whether the filing of a notice of lis
pendens and mechanic's liens are is privileged, are addressed below.'1 9
V. ISSUES IN MINERAL LITIGATION

Many practices common in energy development relating to mineral
interests in real property can give rise to a slander of title lawsuit. While this
Article is not intended to be an exhaustive treatment of all potential
circumstances that could support the cause of action, this section will explore
the more common factual scenarios addressed by courts.
A.

Top Leasing

The concept of top leasing, a practice that has recently become more
common since shale gas has become increasingly recoverable, also raises the
specter of slander of title. Properly defined, a top lease is "a lease granted by a
landowner, during the existence of a recorded mineral lease, which is to
become effective if and when the existing lease expires or is terminated."l 20
The lease in effect at the time the top lease is executed is typically called the
"bottom" lease.' 2' Early courts to address the practice more derisively
characterized it as "claim jumping." 22 Even so, the practice is now (and has
been for some time) a well-settled and legally acceptable method of ensuring
uninterrupted development of energy resources, and is thus a practice that
advances important economic goals.123
The basic function of the top lease is to put the top lessee "next-in-line"
in the event the existing lease terminates, or is ultimately held to have

"'

See infra Part V.

Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Grynberg, 757 P.2d 1125, 1126 (Colo. App. 1988); see also J.
Hovey Kemp, Top Leasing For Oil and Gas: The Legal Perspective, 59 DENV. L.J. 641, 641
(1982) (defining a top lease as "an oil and gas lease covering a mineral estate that is currently
under a valid, existing oil and gas lease").
121
See, e.g., Nantt v. Puckett Energy Co., 382 N.W.2d 655, 657 (N.D. 1986).
122
See Frankfort Oil Co. v. Snakard, 279 F.2d 436, 445 n.23 (10th Cir. 1960) ("In the oil and
gas vernacular to toplease [sic] is to secure a lease on land covered by an existing lease to the end
that the toplease [sic] will be effective after the expiration of the existing lease and the interest of
one or more lessees thereby eliminated. Topleasing [sic] has the same invidious characteristics as
claim jumping.").
123
See Voiles v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 911 P.2d 1205, 1209 (Okla. 1996); see also Nantt,
382 N.W.2d at 659 ("top leasing has become a useful and widespread business practice in the oil
and gas industry in North Dakota, as well as in other regions" (footnote omitted)); David E.
Pierce, Effective Top Leasing andMysteries of the Habendum Clause, 26 OKLA. BAR Ass'N MIN.
L. SEC. NEWSL. No. 2, Apr. 2005, at 2, availableat http://washburnlaw.edu/faculty/pierce-davidfulltext/2005-26oklahomabarassociationminerallawnewsletter2.pdf.
120
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terminated. The goal is to tie-up the mineral interest owner's development
rights before other competitors, including the existing lessee. 12 4
Based on the small number of cases to address the intersection of top
leasing and slander of title, there are only a few definitive principles arising
from such scenarios. First, it is plain enough that the existence of a top lease
does not constitute slander of title per se, as the element of malice must still be
proven.12 At least one commentator has concluded that "[i]f the top lease is
carefully drafted not to express any view on the validity of the existing lease, it
would not appear to be any sort of 'slanderous words."" 2 6 A similar
explanation comes from a recent work published in the Oklahoma Law Review:
When a top lessee joins a mineral lessor in a suit to cancel the
bottom lease, the bottom lessee might defend against the suit
by asserting that his title has been slandered. To buttress this
argument, the bottom lessee might assert that the execution of
an oil and gas lease, despite the continued validity of his prior
lease, constitutes slander of his title. However, the largest
hurdle the bottom lessee faces in proving that his title has been
slandered is showing that the top lessee acted with malice. If
the top lessee has a valid interest, the fact that the lessor
executed the top lease does not show that either party has acted
in bad faith or with lack of probable cause.127
The author goes on to suggest that "the top lessee should make sure
that the top lease states that it is 'subject to' the bottom lease in order to avoid a
slander of title suit." 2 8 This is sound advice.

124
See Nelson Roach, The Rule Against Perpetuities: The Validity of Oil and Gas Top Leases
and Top Deeds in Texas After Peveto v. Starkey, 35 BAYLOR L. REv. 399, 409 (1983) ("Top
leases are an accepted business practice because they increase actual drilling and
competitiveness. Oil companies whose leases have been topped have greater incentive to drill on
leased lands because they cannot keep a claim on large blocks for successive primary terms by
waiting until the end of the primary term to take a renewal. The owner of the bottom lease must
either drill or lose his lease. Furthermore, in addition to increasing drilling and production, top
leasing helps small independent oil companies get leases in thickly leased lands controlled by the
major oil companies.").
125 See, e.g., Voiles, 911 P.2d at 1209.
126 Pierce, supra note 123, at 12.
127 Marichiel Lewis, Oil and Gas: Top Leasing After Voiles v. Santa Fe Minerals-Unethical
Claim-jumping or Prudent Business Practice?, 52 OKLA. L. REv. 127, 138 (1999) (footnotes
omitted).
128
Id. at 141.
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Releases

"Whenever a lien against real estate has been discharged, a release of
lien
should be recorded. . . so that the records will reflect the discharge of
the
the obligation., 2 9 The legal obligations concerning releases vary from state to
state, and with those variations come potential consequences, sometimes
including a slander of title lawsuit. The obligation to release may arise by
statute, contract, or the common law. The statutory obligation to release, for
instance, may result in penalties as expressed in the statute, including an
allowance for recovery of the decrease in market value or for specific statutory
damages.130 Of course, the leaseholder may have a contractual obligation to
release the mineral lease, such that any failure to do so would result in damages
sounding in contract.131
One Oklahoma case is particularly instructive. In Zehner v. Post Oak
Oil Co.,13 2 the refusal of a holder of invalid oil and gas leases to release served
as the principal basis for a slander of title action, as the evidence indicated that
the defendants had attempted to force the plaintiff-lessor to renegotiate leases
favoring the defendants. Notably, though, the right to require terminated oil
and gas leases to be released of record is "so important in Oklahoma that the
legislature has made it a misdemeanor to wrongfully refuse to release." 34 The
question then becomes whether, in the absence of a statutory or contractual
obligation to release, there is an independent common law duty to do so. And
does breach of the common law duty constitute slander of title? The majority
view appears to be that there is no common law duty to release.13 5

John W. Fisher, II, The Scope of Title Examination in West Virginia: Can Reasonable
Minds Differ?, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 449, 529 (1996) (citing W. VA. CODE § 38-12-1 (LexisNexis
Supp. 1995)).
130
See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 57-205 (LexisNexis 2012); see also Eme v. Broiles, 252
P.2d 612, 616 (Kan. 1953); Mollohan v. Patton, 202 P. 616, 618 (Kan. 1921).
See, e.g., Solberg v. Sunburst Oil & Gas Co., 246 P. 168, 171 (Mont. 1926).
132
640 P.2d 991, 994 (Okla. 1981).
129

133

See id. at 994-95.

1"4 Id. at 994. (citing OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 40 (West 1915); see also Dixon v. McCann,
206 P. 597, 599 (Okla. 1922) (The "statute was passed to remedy just this evil. It was to prevent
a lessee who has recorded an oil and gas lease and although it has expired, been abandoned, or
subject to forfeiture, still if not released is a cloud upon the landlord's title, from using this as a
weapon to extort from the landowner money, and use this cloud on his title ... to prevent the
landowner from executing a new lease.").
135
See, e.g., Draper v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 204 P.2d 826, 830 (Utah 1949).
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Texas is the principal exception. In that state, courts have found a
common law duty to release an oil and gas lease after it has terminated.136 In
the seminal case, Kidd v. Hoggett,'37 a mineral lessee attempted to retain the
lease by paying shut-in royalty payments for a well that was not producing
paying quantities.' 38 Assuring the plaintiff that the well was producing, the
lessee refused to release the lease.139 Unable to lease the property to a third
party because of the lessee-defendant's refusal to release his lease, plaintiffs
sued and received special damages for the frustrated sale.140 Therefore, at least
in Texas, a breach of the common law duty to release an expired lease, even
when the lessee is not required to do so under the provisions of the lease, can
give rise to a cause of action for slander of title.141
But absent a statutory, contractual, or common law obligation to
release a terminated lease, such an act may not give rise to a slander of title
claim. No case has recognized a common law duty to release a terminated or
otherwise invalid leasehold interest in West Virginia, and no statute creates the
duty. There is little indication in West Virginia authority to suggest that a future
decision would (or should) recognize such a duty.
C.

Lis Pendens

"Lis pendens provides a mechanism for putting the public on notice of
certain categories of litigation involving real property." 42 Most states require
the filing a notice of pending litigation, commonly referred to as lis pendens,
when such a lawsuit is filed. For example, a notice of lis pendens is properly
filed in West Virginia only when a person seeks "to enforce any lien upon,
right to, or interest in designated real estate." 4 3 Indeed, "[t]he recordation of a
See Witherspoon v. Green, 274 S.W. 170, 171 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) ("The law charged
appellee with the duty of removing this cloud from appellant's title by the execution of a release
of his apparent, though not actual, interest in the land.").
137
331 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
136

1'
See id. at 517. The court noted that under then-Texas law, "[s]hut-in royalty payments
excuse production only if the well is actually capable of producing gas in paying quantities." Id.
at 519. The court concluded that the lease terminated because the leasehold mineral estate was
not capable of producing in paying quantities regardless of the defendants' continued payment of
shut-in royalties. Id.
139

Id. at 517.

140

id
Id.; see also Ellis v. Waldrop, 656 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Tex. 1983) ("[A] cause of action to
recover damages for the failure to release a purported, though not actual, property interest is a
cause of action for slander of title."); Sw. Guar. Trust Co. v. Hardy Road 13.4 Joint Venture, 981
S.W.2d 951, 954 (Tex. App. 1998).
142
Prappas v. Meyerland Cmty. Imp. Ass'n, 795 S.W.2d 794, 795 (Tex. App. 1990).
143
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-11-2 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008).
141
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formal notice of the pendency of a suit is required only if the proceeding is one
to subject real estate to debt or liability."1 44 Many slander of title suits have
arisen from the false filing of lis pendens, but as explained below, many courts
have found lis pendens filings privileged.14 5
For example, Oklahoma courts have stated that the notice of lis
pendens "is cloaked with the same privilege attaching to the issues in
litigation."l46 An earlier California decision explains:
Since the effect of a lis pendens is to give constructive notice
of all the facts apparent upon the face of the pleading, and of
those other facts of which the facts so stated necessarily put a
purchaser on inquiry [], the recordation of a notice of lis
pendens is in effect a republication of the pleadings. The
disparagement of title arises, therefore, from the recordation of
the notice of lis pendens as well as from the pleadings. The
publication of the pleadings is unquestionably clothed with
absolute privilege, and we have concluded that the
republication thereof by recording a notice of lis pendens is

similarly privileged.147
South Carolina is in agreement with this view.14 8 Notwithstanding the
harsh result that privileged notices of lis pendens can affect, at least one
decision has observed that "it does not extinguish every form of relief when a
party files a lis pendens which is motivated by some malicious intent. The
jurisdictions are in agreement that the proper action against a maliciously filed
lis pendens is under abuse of process or malicious prosecution." 4 9
Despite the general agreement favoring absolute privilege for lis
pendens, there is support for the contrary view.150 One commentator reasons:

State ex rel. Watson v. White, 408 S.E.2d 66, 71 (W. Va. 1991).
See, e.g., Procacci v. Zacco, 402 So. 2d 425, 427 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) ("Since the
notice of lis pendens has no existence separate and apart from the litigation of which it gives
notice, we hold that appellants' filing of a notice of lis pendens was a part of the judicial
proceeding to determine the existence of an easement and thus, it is encompassed within the
judicial proceedings privilege.").
146
Morford v. Eberly & Meade, Inc., 879 P.2d 841, 843 (Okla. Civ. App. 1994).
144
145

147
Albertson v. Raboff, 295 P.2d 405, 408 (Cal. 1956) (en banc) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
148
Pond Place Partners, Inc. v. Poole, 567 S.E.2d 881, 896-97 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002).

Id. at 897.
See, e.g., Ex parte Boykin, 656 So. 2d 821, 826 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994); Montecalvo v.
Mandarelli, 682 A.2d 918, 924 (R.I. 1996). The Montecalvo court explained:
A notice of lis pendens is filed on the public record for the purpose of
warning all interested persons that the title to the subject property is being
disputed in litigation and that, therefore, any person who subsequently
149
150
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[T]he privilege granted to communications in the actual course
of a judicial proceeding does not extend to a lis pendens notice
since its recordation is a private act, outside the purview of
judicial proceedings, undertaken for the purpose of calling
attention to the pendency of litigation. It is arguable that denial
of the privilege will inhibit use of the lis pendens procedure
and thereby defeat its purpose. However, malice is necessary
for an action of slander of title; hence a lis pendens notice
recorded with probable cause and in good faith would furnish
no basis for the action.

..

. Since the recording of a lis pendens

notice is not subject to judicial control, it would not be
privileged, and it would be actionable upon proof that the
15
claim was false and that the notice was filed maliciously. 1
In this way, the filing of a lis pendens can also be thought of as
conferring qualified privilege. 152 At least one court has described the qualified
immunity accorded a lis pendens as subject to two conditions: "(1) the pleader
must have a reasonable ground for believing the truth of the pleading, and (2)
the statements made in the pleading must be reasonably calculated to
accomplish the privileged purpose."l 53
These principles tend to indicate that a slander of title action based on
an unfounded notice of lis pendens may succeed only where there is actually no
pending litigation to which the slanderous notice refers, or where the litigation
has no connection to the property interest described in the notice. 154 In either
case, it is important to remember that however the slander is published, the
plaintiff's claim must still meet the other requirements of the cause of action.

acquires an interest in the property does so subject to the risk of being bound
by an adverse judgment in the pending case. The purpose of the notice is to
preserve a party's rights in the property pending the outcome of the litigation.
As plaintiff has noted, the practical effect of filing a lis pendens may well be
to render the property unmarketable during the pendency of the underlying
dispute. If, however, a party files a notice of a lis pendens absent a good-faith
belief in his or her claim to the title of the property, then he or she utters a
statement knowing it is false and malice may properly be inferred.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
151 Frank W. Elliott, Jr., Note, Libel and Slander-Lis Pendens-FilingofLis Pendens Notice
Not Privileged-Albertson v. Raboff, 287 P.2D 145 (Cal. 1955), 34 TEX. L. REv. 657, 659
(1956).
152
See Westfield Dev. Co. v. Rifle Inv. Assocs., 786 P.2d 1112, 1116 (Colo. 1990);
Kensington Dev. Corp. v. Israel, 419 N.W.2d 241, 245 (Wis. 1988).
153 Kensington Dev. Corp., 419 N.W.2d at 245.
154
See Hewitt v. Rice, 154 P.3d 408, 412 (Colo. 2007); Wendy's of S. Jersey, Inc. v.
Blanchard Mgmt. Corp., 406 A.2d 1337, 1339 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1979).
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Instruments and Liens

The single most common act supporting a slander of title claim in the
energy context is the filing or recording of an unfounded claim against the
mineral interest owned by another.
For example, an action for slander of title has been sustained against an
oil and gas lessor who filed an affidavit to terminate a lease, claiming that the
lessee had violated the lease by failing to produce in commercial quantities,
when, in fact, the lessee was producing in commercial quantities. 55 The court
determined that the lessee was reckless in concluding otherwise, which
satisfied the malice requirement.' 56 And as noted above, the act of publication
in the TXO case was an unfounded recordation of a quitclaim deed:
The jury found that by recording a quitclaim deed which it
knew to be frivolous, TXO satisfied the requirements for
slander of title. TXO argues that recording a quitclaim deed
cannot be construed as the publication of a frivolous statement
with the intent to prevent others from dealing with the claimant
as required for an action for slander of title. We disagree.
Recording a quitclaim deed that one knows to be frivolous is
no different from saying to a potential purchaser-"I don't
think you should buy that land. You know there is a cloud on
the title because of Mr. Signaigo's old deed." 5 1
Similarly, the filing of an invalid lease and subsequent refusal to
release it has been held to support a slander action. 58 Other "[s]pecific
examples ... include mortgage holders, parties who have judgment liens, or
parties who may have signed contracts to purchase or lease the property."' 5 9
Even the unfounded filing of a mechanics lien has been found to support the
cause of action, 160 though one commentator argues that those who file
155

See Duncan Land & Exploration, Inc. v. Littlepage, 984 S.W.2d 318, 332 (Tex.
App.

1998).
156

id.

TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 879-80 (W. Va. 1992); see also
Colquhoun v. Webber, 684 A.2d 405, 411 (Me. 1996) (filing frivolous quitclaim deed during
pendency of quiet title action could support slander of title suit); Jumping Rainbow Ranch v.
Conklin, 538 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Mont. 1975) ("[T]he action of [the defendant] in filing his
quitclaim deed was such as to warrant the necessary showing of malice to entitle plaintiff to
punitive damages."); Green v. Lemarr, 744 N.E.2d 212, 226 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) ("[W]e think
the [defendants] could be held liable if they frivolously filed the quitclaim deed and took a deed
back, as long as the remaining elements for slander of title ... are also proven.").
See Reaugh v. McCollum Exploration Co., 163 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tex.
1942).
159
Green, 744 N.E.2d at 224.
160
See, e.g., Contract Dev. Corp. v. Beck, 627 N.E.2d 760, 768 (Ill. App. Ct.
1994).
157
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mechanics liens should be shielded by absolute privilege for "statements made
in the course of litigation."' 6 '
These are but a few of the most common methods constituting the
publication of disparaging statements that may lead to a successful claim for
slander of title in the context of a property-based energy law practice.
VI. CONCLUSION

The slander of title plaintiff does not occupy an enviable position. As
briefly explored in this primer, the elements and proof required to establish a
slander of title claim are demanding, both at the pleading and at the proving
stage of litigation. In particular, the malice and special damages requirements
pose particularly high hurdles for a party wronged by the overzealous landman
or the unsophisticated, yet impatient operator. But for those rarer occasions,
such as those illustrated by the TXO case, slander of title can be a uniquely
powerful device to part the tortfeasor of significant assets to pay the injured
party and potentially punish and prevent further wrongful conduct.
Ultimately, as the rush to lease (and re-lease) natural gas interests for
future drilling throughout the Marcellus and Utica shale regions, practitioners
must take care to ensure their clients do not allow ambitious methods to trod on
the property rights of others. Equally so, they must be prepared to assess the
contours of the increasingly complex transactions involving mineral interests so
that any potential disparagement is uncovered and promptly remedied.

161
Michael G. Cortina, Mechanics Liens and Slander of Title: The Case for Absolute
Privilege, 92 ILL. B.J. 267 (2004).
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